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Start-Up Subsidies in East Germany: 
Finally, a Policy that Works?
*
 
The German government has spent between 7bn and 11bn Euro per year on active labor 
market policies (ALMP) in East Germany in the last decade. The effectiveness of the most 
important programs (in terms of participants and spending) such as job-creation schemes 
and vocational training has been evaluated quite thoroughly in recent years. The results are 
disappointing, indicating that nearly all of these ‘traditional’ programs have to be rated as a 
failure. In light of these findings, policies to encourage unemployed people to become self-
employed gained increasing importance. We present first evidence on the effectiveness of 
two start-up programs in East Germany. Our findings – even though partly preliminary – are 
rather promising, showing that these programs increase employment chances and earnings 
of participants. Hence, start-up subsidies might work even in a labor market with structural 
problems such as the one in East Germany. 
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* The author thanks Ulf Rinne for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
Faced with unemployment rates around 20% over the last decade, the German government
spent between 7bn and 11bn Euro per year on active labor market policies (ALMP) in East
Germany to combat this situation. The most important measures (in terms of participants
and spending) during this period have been job-creation schemes and vocational training
programs. The eﬀectiveness of these programs has been evaluated quite thoroughly in
recent years. Based on very informative administrative data and matching techniques,
Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Waller (2007) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent
training programs, whereas Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2007) concentrate on job-
creation schemes. The ﬁndings are disappointing: Biewen et al. (2007) do not ﬁnd any
positive eﬀects for short-, medium- or long-term training in East Germany for women and
only little evidence of positive eﬀects for some male subgroups. Caliendo et al. (2007)
show that participating in a job-creation scheme generally lowers the employment chances
of participants; only long-term unemployed women seem to slightly beneﬁt three years
after programs have started. Lechner and Wunsch (2006) compare the relative eﬀects of
diﬀerent programs (including diﬀerent types of training, job-creation schemes and shorter
measures) and conclude that all programs do not improve the employment chances or
earnings of participants. Even though they note that the programs might have had other
beneﬁcial eﬀects, judging by the main goal—integration into regular employment—nearly
all of these ‘traditional’ programs have to be rated as a failure.
In light of these disappointing ﬁndings the Federal Employment Agency (FEA)
tested a new strategy to combat the unemployment problem by turning unemployment
into self-employment. Whereas in 1994 only 37,000 business start-ups by formerly unem-
ployed individuals where funded, the number was above 350,000 in 2004 (approximately
100,000 in East Germany). This increase was driven, among other things, by a new
program known as the ‘start-up subsidy’ (SUS, Existenzgr¨ undungszuschuss), which was
introduced in 2003 as part of the Hartz reforms and implemented in addition to the already
existing ‘bridging allowance’ (BA, ¨ Uberbr¨ uckungsgeld). Both programs diﬀer in their de-
sign, the most important diﬀerence being in respect of the amount and duration of the
subsidy. While the BA pays recipients the same amount that they would have received
as unemployment beneﬁts for a period of six months (plus a lump sum of roughly 70% to
cover social security contributions), the SUS runs for three years, paying a lump sum of
e600/month for the ﬁrst year, e360/month for the second, and e240/month for the third.
Later on we will show that this diﬀerent design also attracted diﬀerent target groups.
1Since these programs are usually also associated with the hope for further positive
eﬀects, e.g., through direct job-creation, they could potentially not only decrease East
Germany’s persistently high unemployment rate, but increase its low (self-)employment
rate as well. Looking at the FEA’s spending on ALMP, we clearly see the increasing pri-
ority assigned to these programs within the overall ALMP strategy. Whereas only 1.1% of
ALMP resources were allocated to these measures in 1995, this number was 8.9% in 2004.
Empirical evidence on these programs is scarce in general and non-existent for East Ger-
many. Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of both programs in
West Germany and ﬁnd considerable positive employment and earnings eﬀects.1 The pa-
pers mentioned above based on administrative data usually exclude start-up subsidies from
the analysis, since the administrative data only includes information on employment which
is subject to social security contributions. Since this is not the case for self-employment,
administrative data does not allow to draw conclusions about employment or earnings
eﬀects for self-employed individuals.
The contribution of this paper is as follows: we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of both
start-up programs in East Germany. Since the major goal of German ALMP is to
avoid future unemployment and integrate unemployed individuals into the primary la-
bor market, we concentrate on the outcome variables ‘not unemployed’ and ‘in paid or
self-employment’. In addition, we analyze the program’s eﬀects on personal income. We
compare the labor market outcomes of the formerly unemployed entrepreneurs with other
unemployed individuals (and not with other business start-ups). This approach is driven
by the consideration that start-up subsidies form one component of ALMP, and their ef-
fectiveness should thus be compared to other ALMP programs. We base our analysis on
a combination of administrative data from the FEA and a follow-up survey, containing
approximately 1,300 participants in both programs who founded a business in the third
quarter of 2003 in East Germany. The interviews took place at the beginning of 2005 and
2006, so that we observe individuals for at least 28 months after programs have started.
While this means we can monitor the employment paths of individuals for at least 22
months after the program has ended for the BA, SUS was still going on at the end of our
observation period. At this stage, participants in SUS were in their third year of partici-
pation and were receiving a reduced transfer payment. Hence, results for this program
are only preliminary and interpretation hinges on this drawback. Additionally, we have a
group of unemployed individuals (approx. 950) who were eligible for either program but
1Caliendo and Steiner (2007) additionally show, that these programs are also monetary eﬃcient (from
the viewpoint of the Federal Employment Agency).
2did not choose to participate in the third quarter of 2003. This nonparticipant group will
function as our comparison group.
Given this informative data set, we base our analysis on the conditional independence
assumption and use kernel matching estimators to estimate the treatment eﬀects. To
test the sensitivity of the results with respect to unobserved diﬀerences we also use a
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith,
and Todd (1998). The results show that at the end of our observation period both programs
are eﬀective in terms of the above-mentioned outcome variables. Unemployment rates
of participants are lower, and employment rates and personal income are higher when
compared to nonparticipants. Hence, this is ﬁrst evidence that this relatively new ALMP
instrument might work even in a labor market with structural problems such as the one
in East Germany. Additionally, we present ﬁrst descriptive evidence on the additional
employment eﬀects trough direct job creation. We ﬁnd quite signiﬁcant eﬀects (e.g., 28%
of the males have already at least one employee) for BA, whereas the eﬀects are negligible
for participants in the SUS.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy summarizes some facts about the
East German labor market, focusing on self-employment, unemployment, and active labor
market policies. Section 3 outlines our evaluation approach, while Section 4 describes the
data used for the analysis. In Section 5 we discuss some implementation issues, Section 6
contains the results and, ﬁnally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Unemployment, Self-Employment and Start-Up Subsidies
in East Germany
Table 1 contains some summary statistics of the East German labor market. It can be
seen that the self-employment rate has steadily increased from 8% in 1994 to around 11%
in 2004, reaching the same level as West Germany. On the other hand, the unemploy-
ment rate is persistently high, ﬂuctuating around 20% and 22% after 2000. To over-
come this unemployment problem, the German government spends signiﬁcant amounts
on ALMP (approximately e8 billion in East Germany in 2004) including measures like
vocational training programs, job-creation schemes, employment subsidies, and subsidized
self-employment of formerly unemployed individuals.
Insert Table 1 about here
3Until 2003 the bridging allowance was the only program providing support to unem-
ployed individuals who wanted to start their own business. Its main goal is to cover basic
costs of living and social security contributions during the initial stage of self-employment.
BA supports the ﬁrst six months of self-employment by providing the same amount that
the recipient of a BA would have received if he or she had remained unemployed. Since
the unemployment scheme also covers social security contributions (including health insur-
ance, retirement insurance, etc.) a lump sum for social security is granted, equal to 68.5%
of the unemployment support that would have been received in 2003. Unemployed people
are entitled to BA conditional on their business plan being approved externally, usually
by the regional chamber of commerce. Thus, approval of an individual’s application does
not depend on the case manager at the local labor oﬃce.
In January 2003, an additional program was introduced to support unemployed
people in starting a new business. This ‘start-up subsidy’ was introduced as part of a large
package of ALMP programs introduced through the ‘Hartz reforms’.2 The main goal of
SUS is to secure the initial phase of self-employment. It focuses on the provision of social
security to the newly self-employed person. The support is a lump sum of e600/month
in the ﬁrst year. A growth barrier is implemented in SUS such that the support is only
granted if income does not exceed e25,000 per year. The support shrinks to e360/month
in the second year and e240/month in the third. In contrast to the BA, SUS recipients are
obligated to pay into the statutory pension insurance fund and may claim a reduced rate
for statutory health insurance (Koch and Wießner, 2003). When the SUS was introduced
in 2003, applicants did not have to submit business plans for prior approval, but have been
required to do so since November 2004, as was already the case with the BA. See Table
2 for more details on both programs. In this institutional framework, rational program
choice favors a BA if the unemployment beneﬁts are fairly high and/or if the income
generated through the start-up ﬁrm is expected to exceed e25,000. Both programs were
replaced in August 2006 by a single new program—the new start-up subsidy program
(Gr¨ undungszuschuss)—which will not be analyzed here.3
Insert Table 2 about here
Hence, for a period of nearly four years, unemployed individuals could choose be-
tween two programs to help them start their own business. Table 1 contains some infor-
2See Caliendo and Steiner (2005) for an overview of the most relevant elements of the ‘Harts reforms’.
3See Caliendo and Kritikos (2007a) for information and a critical discussion of the features of the new
program.
4mation on participants and spending in measures promoting self-employment from 1995
to 2004. In 1995, about 2.3% of all unemployed individuals in East Germany partici-
pated in BA, and the FEA spent 1.1% of their total resources for ALMP on BA. Numbers
remained relatively constant until 2003 when the second program was introduced. In
the ﬁrst year following its introduction, nearly 30,000 individuals made use of the SUS.
Table 1 also shows that the introduction of the SUS did not replace the BA but made
self-employment signiﬁcantly more attractive for the unemployed (BA entries increased
by roughly 12%).4 In 2004, as much as 6.5% of East Germany’s unemployed participated
in these two programs, absorbing a share of 9% of the total spending on ALMP.
3 Identifying Average Treatment Eﬀects
We base our analysis on the potential outcome framework, also known as the Roy(1951)-
Rubin(1974) model. The two potential outcomes are Y 1 (individual receives treatment,
D = 1) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treatment, D = 0). The actually observed
outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1
i ·Di+(1−Di)·Y 0
i . The treatment
eﬀect for each individual i is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between her potential outcomes:
τi = Y 1
i − Y 0
i . Since we can never observe both potential outcomes for the same individual
at the same time, the fundamental evaluation problem arises. We will focus on the most
prominent evaluation parameter, which is the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(ATT), and is given by:
τATT = E(Y 1 | D = 1) − E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
Given equation (1), the problem of selection bias can be straightforwardly seen
since the second term on the right hand side is unobservable. It describes the hypo-
thetical outcome without treatment for those individuals who received treatment. Since
with non-experimental data the condition E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0) is usually
not satisﬁed, estimating ATT by the diﬀerence in sub-population means of participants
E(Y 1 | D = 1) and non-participants E(Y 0 | D = 0) will lead to a selection bias. This
bias arises because participants and non-participants are selected groups that would have
diﬀerent outcomes, even in absence of the program, and might be caused by observ-
able or unobservable factors.5 We will combine two evaluation methods—matching and
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences—to cover both possible sources of selection bias.
4Caliendo and Kritikos (2007b) discuss in detail not only the characteristics of the new entrepreneurs
but also those of the created businesses.
5See, e.g., Caliendo and Hujer (2006) for further discussion.
53.1 Matching under Unconfoundedness
Matching is based on the conditional independence (or unconfoundedness) assumption,
which states that conditional on some covariates W = (X,Z), the potential outcomes
(Y 1,Y 0) are independent of D.6 Since we are interested in ATT only, we only need to
assume that Y 0 is independent of D, because the moments of the distribution of Y 1 for
the treatment group can be directly estimated. That is:
Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness for Comparison Group: Y 0 q D|W,
where q denotes independence. Clearly, this assumption may be a very strong one and has
to be justiﬁed on a case-by-case basis, since the researcher needs to observe all variables
that simultaneously inﬂuence participation and outcomes. We will do so in Section 5.1.
Additionally, it has to be assumed that:
Assumption 2 Weak Overlap: Pr(D = 1 | W) < 1,
for all W. This implies that there is a positive probability for all W of not participating,
i.e., that there are no perfect predictors which determine participation. These assumptions
are suﬃcient for identiﬁcation of the ATT, which can be written as:
τMAT
ATT = E(Y 1|W,D = 1) − EW[E(Y 0|W,D = 0)|D = 1], (2)
where the ﬁrst term can be estimated from the treatment group and the second term from
the mean outcomes of the matched comparison group. The outer expectation is taken
over the distribution of W in the treatment group.
As matching on W can become hazardous when W is of high dimension (‘curse
of dimensionality’), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of balancing scores
b(W). These are functions of the relevant observed covariates W such that the conditional
distribution of W given b(W) is independent of the assignment to treatment, that is,
W q D|b(W). The propensity score P(W), i.e., the probability of participating in a
program, is one possible balancing score. For participants and nonparticipants with the
same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates W are the same, i.e., they are
balanced across the groups. Hence, assumption 1 can be re-written as Y 0 q D|P(W) and
the new overlap condition is given by Pr(D = 1 | P(W)) < 1.
6See Imbens (2004) or Smith and Todd (2005) for recent overviews regarding matching methods.
63.2 Combining Matching with Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
Even though we will argue in Section 5.1 that the CIA is most likely to hold in our
setting, we will test the sensitivity of our results with respect to unobserved heterogene-
ity. The matching estimator described so far assumes that after conditioning on a set
of observable characteristics, (mean) outcomes are independent of program participation.
The conditional DID or DID matching estimator relaxes this assumption and allows for
unobservable but temporally invariant diﬀerences in outcomes between participants and
nonparticipants. This is achieved by comparing the conditional before/after outcomes of
participants with those of nonparticipants. DID matching was ﬁrst suggested by Heckman
et al. (1998). It extends the conventional DID estimator by deﬁning outcomes conditional
on the propensity score and using semiparametric methods to construct the diﬀerences.
Therefore, it is superior to DID as it does not impose linear functional form restrictions
in estimating the conditional expectations of the outcome variable, and it re-weights the
observations according to the weighting function of the matching estimator (Smith and
Todd, 2005). If the parameter of interest is ATT, the DID propensity score matching
estimator is based on the following identifying assumption:
E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1] = E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0], (3)
where (t) is the post-treatment and (t0) the pre-treatment period. It also requires the
common support condition to hold and can be written as:
τCDID
ATT = E(Y 1
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1) − E(Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0). (4)
4 Data and Some Descriptives
We use a unique data set which combines administrative data from the FEA with survey
data.7 For the administrative part we use data based on the ‘Integrated Labor Market
Biographies’ (ILMB, Integrierte Erwerbs-Biographien) of the FEA, containing relevant
register data from four sources: employment history, unemployment support receipt, par-
ticipation in active labor market measures, and job seeker history. Since the administrative
data are only available with a certain time lag and more importantly, do not provide any
information on the employment status and/or income of self-employed individuals, we en-
7The data was gathered within a research project for the Federal Ministry of Labor (see Forschungsver-
bund IAB, DIW, SINUS, GfA, infas, 2006, for details).
7riched the ILMB data with information from a computer-assisted telephone interview. To
do so, we randomly drew participants from each program who became self-employed in
the third quarter of 2003. Since we wanted to compare them with nonparticipants, we had
to choose a comparison group. Choosing such a group is a heavily discussed topic in the
recent evaluation literature. Although participation in ALMP programs is not mandatory
in Germany, the majority of unemployed persons participate at some point in time. Thus,
comparing participants to individuals who never participate is inadequate, since it can
be assumed that the latter group is particularly selective.8 Sianesi (2004) discusses this
problem for Sweden and argues that those who never participate did not enter a program
because they had already found a job. Additionally, since we did not know the future em-
ployment/participation status of the comparison group before the interviews took place,
we restricted this comparison group to those who were unemployed in the third quarter of
2003, eligible for participation in either of the two programs, but did not join a program
in this quarter. What should be kept in mind is that these comparison group members
might participate in some ALMP program after this quarter.9
To minimise the survey costs we used a crude propensity score matching approach
to select somewhat similar unemployed individuals.10 These individuals were interviewed
twice. The ﬁrst interview took place in January/February 2005 and the second in Jan-
uary/February 2006. This enables us to observe the labor market activity of individuals
for at least 28 months after programs started. We compiled a sample of 1,297 individuals
who had started a new business out of unemployment. Of these, 647 individuals received
a SUS and 650 received BA. Additionally, a control group of 943 nonparticipants was
assembled.
A full list of the available variables can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix;
Table 3 contains sample means of the most relevant ones. What should be kept in mind is
the non-random sample of nonparticipants. Since we used a crude matching approach to
make individuals similar, the nonparticipant sample does not represent a random sample
of unemployed individuals. Clearly, this does not aﬀect our estimation and interpretation
8Furthermore, it should be noted that using individuals who are observed to never participate in the
programs as the comparison group may invalidate the conditional independence assumption due to condi-
tioning on future outcomes (see discussion in Fredriksson and Johansson, 2007).
9The actual number of nonparticipants who participated in any ALMP program after this quarter is
rather low. It is approximately 5% after 12, 7% after 18 and around 10% after 24 months.
10The potential comparison group consisted of roughly 330,000 individuals. Control individuals (for
the interview) were chosen to resemble the distribution of some key variables—including gender, region,
age, previous unemployment duration, qualiﬁcation, and nationality—in the population of the treated
individuals. To do so, we estimated a ‘crude propensity score’ based on these variables and chose for every
participant nonparticipants with a similar propensity score as interviewees.
8strategy but should be kept in mind when interpreting the diﬀerences.
Insert Table 3 about here
A ﬁrst glance at the number of observations reveals clear gender diﬀerences in par-
ticipation in both programs. Whereas the male-female ratio is about 2.2:1 for BA, it is
only 1.3:1 for the SUS. Further diﬀerences arise when looking at qualiﬁcations. In general
it can be stated that participants in SUS are less qualiﬁed (when compared to BA partici-
pants). This is true for the comparison of the participants’ qualiﬁcations either by highest
school-leaving degree or the variable ‘job qualiﬁcations’, an assessment by the placement
oﬃcer in the local labor oﬃce. Based on that, it is hardly surprising that participants in
BA programs also have a more favorable labor market history. Not only were they less
frequently found among the long-term unemployed before starting a program they also
had higher and longer claims for unemployment beneﬁts. We will discuss the available
variables in more detail in the next section, where we also discuss the validity of the CIA.
5 Implementing the Estimators
Having discussed our evaluation approach in the previous section, we now present details
on the implementation of the propensity score matching estimator. Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008) provide an extensive overview of the issues arising when implementing matching
estimators. They point out that a crucial step is to discuss the likely validity of the
underlying CIA. Hence, we deal with this issue in Section 5.1. This will be followed by
the estimation of the propensity score and a discussion of matching details in 5.2.
5.1 Validity of the CIA and Propensity Score Estimation
The CIA is in general a very strong assumption and the applicability of the matching
estimator depends crucially on its plausibility. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005)
argue that the plausibility of such an assumption should always be discussed on a case-
by-case basis. Only variables that inﬂuence the participation decision and the outcome
variable simultaneously should be included in the matching procedure. Hence, economic
theory, a sound knowledge of previous research and information about the institutional
setting should guide the researcher in specifying the model (see, e.g., Smith and Todd,
2005 or Sianesi, 2004).
9Both economic theory and previous empirical evaluation studies highlight the im-
portance of socio-demographic and qualiﬁcational variables. Regarding the ﬁrst category
we can use variables such as age, marital status, number of children, nationality (German
or foreigner), and health restrictions. Additionally, we also use information whether indi-
viduals want to work full-time or part-time, and hence we might be able to approximate
the labor market ﬂexibility of these individuals. A second class of variables (qualiﬁcation
variables) refers to the human capital of the individual, which is also a crucially important
determinant of labor market prospects. The attributes available are school degree, job
qualiﬁcation, and work experience. Furthermore, previous evaluation studies also point
out that unemployment dynamics and labor market history play a major role in driving
outcomes and program participation. Hence, we use career variables describing the indi-
vidual’s labor market history. The available data in this regard is quite extensive (inter
alia: nearly complete seven-year labor market history; daily earnings from employment;
amount of daily unemployment beneﬁts; duration of last unemployment spell, employ-
ment status before unemployment, previous profession, etc.). Heckman et al. (1998) also
emphasize the importance of drawing treatment and comparison groups from the same
local labor market and giving them the same questionnaire, where the latter is ensured in
our data. To account for the situation on the local labor market, we use a classiﬁcation of
similar and comparable labor oﬃce districts derived by the FEA (see Blien et. al, 2004,
for details). Finally, the institutional structure and the selection process into programs
provide further guidance in selecting the relevant variables. As we have seen from the
discussion in Section 2, the two programs diﬀer, among other things, in the size of the
subsidy. Whereas the SUS is a lump sum, the BA depends on the amount of the unem-
ployment beneﬁts. Hence, we include the daily unemployment transfer payment before
the start of the program as an explanatory variable. In contrast to many other studies, we
are also able to include the remaining duration of unemployment beneﬁts, which probably
plays a determining role in these individuals’ decision.11
Based on this exhaustive data, we argue that the CIA holds in our application. The
set of variables is extensive and covers nearly all variables which have been identiﬁed to be
important in previous evaluation studies of labor market policies. However, it should also
be clear that some variables which might inﬂuence self-employment dynamics are absent in
our data (see Georgellis, Sessions, and Tsisianis, 2005, for a recent overview). Even though
one might argue that these variables, e.g., intergenerational links, are less important in
11Lechner and Wunsch (2006) evaluate the eﬀectiveness of ALMP (excluding start-up subsidies) in East
Germany using a very similar set of variables.
10our context (since we compare participants with other unemployed individuals), we test
the sensitivity of the results with respect to time-invariant unobserved diﬀerences between
participants and nonparticipants.
5.2 Propensity Score Estimation and Matching Details
Since the choice probabilities are not known a priori, we have to replace them with an
estimate. To do so, we estimate binary conditional probabilities for both programs versus
nonparticipation. Since we estimate the eﬀects separately for men and women, we are left
with four logit estimations. The results can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. To
ensure the comparability between the estimates, we choose the same covariates for each
combination and both genders. We do not interpret the results of the propensity score
estimation since we only use this estimation to reduce the dimensionality problem and the
group of participants and nonparticipants are already quite similar due to the construction
of the data.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The distribution of the propensity score is depicted in Figure 1. A visual analysis
already suggests that the overlap between the group of participants and nonparticipants
is suﬃcient in general. Nevertheless, there are some parts of the distribution (starting
approximately at a propensity score value of 0.7) where the mass of comparison individuals
is quite thin. This is especially true for female participants in BA. However, by using the
usual ‘Minmax’ criterion, where treated individuals are excluded from the sample whose
propensity score lies above the highest propensity score in the comparison group, only 26
individuals are dropped overall.12
Several matching procedures have been suggested in the literature, such as nearest-
neighbor or kernel matching.13 To introduce them, a more general notation is needed: let
I0 and I1 denote the set of indices for nonparticipants and participants. We estimate the
eﬀect of treatment for each treated observation i ∈ I1 in the treatment group by contrasting
her outcome with treatment with a weighted average of control group observations j ∈ I0
12We also test the sensitivity of the results with respect to a stricter imposition of the common support
requirement, e.g., by dropping 5%(10%) of the individuals where the overlap between participants and
nonparticipants is especially low. It turns out that the results are not sensitive.
13See Heckman et al. (1998), Smith and Todd (2005), and Imbens (2004) for overviews.












where N0 is the number of observations in the control group I0 and N1 is the number of
observations in the treatment group I1. Matching estimators diﬀer in the weights attached
to the members of the comparison group, where ωN0(i,j) is the weight placed on the j-th
individual from the comparison group in constructing the counterfactual for the i-th indi-
vidual of the treatment group (Heckman et al., 1998). For example, with nearest-neighbor
matching, only the closest neighbor is used to construct the counterfactual outcome, while
kernel matching (KM) is a non-parametric estimator that uses (nearly) all units in the
control group. One major advantage of KM is the lower variance which is achieved because
more information is used for constructing counterfactual outcomes. Since our treatment
and comparison groups are rather small, we will focus on this method in the later empir-
ical application.14 An additional advantage of kernel matching comes from the results of
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) who derive the asymptotic distribution of these esti-
mators and show that bootstrapping is valid to draw inference for this matching method.
This allows us to circumvent the issues raised by Abadie and Imbens (2006), pointing out
that bootstrap methods are invalid for NN matching.
Before applying kernel matching, assumptions have to be made regarding the choice
of the kernel function and the bandwidth parameter h. The choice of the kernel appears
to be relatively unimportant in practice (see, e.g., Jones, Marron, and Sheather (1996),
Pagan and Ullah (1999), or DiNardo and Tobias (2001)). What is seen as more important
is the choice of the bandwidth parameter h with the following trade-oﬀ arising: high
values of h yield a smoother estimated density function, producing a better ﬁt and a
decreasing variance between the estimated and the true underlying density function. On
the other hand, underlying features may be smoothed away by a large h, leading to a
biased estimate. The choice of h is therefore a compromise between a small variance and
an unbiased estimate of the true density function. Instead of using a ‘rule of thumb’ as
proposed by Silverman (1986), we use ‘leave-one-out’ cross-validation (CV) as suggested in
Black and Smith (2004) and Galdo (2005) to choose h. More details and most importantly,
the chosen bandwidth parameters can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. We will
14Additional sensitivity analysis reveals that our results are not sensitive to the matching algorithm
chosen. Results are available from the author on request.
12use these bandwidth parameters for the further empirical analysis.15
To test if the matching procedure is able to balance all the covariates we ran a stan-
dardized diﬀerence (SD) test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). This is a suitable indicator
to assess the distance in marginal distributions of the W-variables. For each covariate W
it is deﬁned as the diﬀerence of sample means in the treated and matched control subsam-
ples as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups.
This is a common approach used in many evaluation studies, including those by Lechner
(1999), Sianesi (2004) and Caliendo et al. (2007). Table 4 shows the mean standardized
diﬀerence (MSD), i.e., the mean of the SD over all covariates before and after the matching
took place.
Insert Table 4 about here
It can be seen that the MSD before matching lies between 7.4% for women and 9.2%
for men in SUS and even between 15.1% (men) and 19.4% (women) in BA. The matching
procedure is able to balance the distribution of the covariates very well. The MSD after
matching lies below 5% for all the subgroups. Additionally, Sianesi (2004) suggests re-
estimating the propensity score on the matched sample (i.e., on the participants and
matched nonparticipants) and comparing the pseudo-R2’s before and after matching. After
matching there should be no systematic diﬀerences in the distribution of the covariates
between the two groups. Therefore, the pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly low. As
the results from Table 4 show, this is true for our estimation. The results of the F-tests
point in the same direction, indicating a joint signiﬁcance of all regressors before but not
after matching. Overall, these are satisfying results and show that the matching procedure
was successful in balancing the covariates between treated individuals and members from
the comparison group. Hence, we move on to the presentation of the results.
6 Results
We discuss the eﬀectiveness of the two programs in relation to nonparticipation based on
three outcome variables: ﬁrst, we want to know if program participation lowers the risk
of returning to unemployment. To this end, we construct a variable that treats registered
unemployment as a failure and all possible other states as a success (outcome variable
A). Since avoiding unemployment is one of the two major goals of German ALMP, this
15Estimations are done using the PSMATCH2 Stata ado-package by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
13allows us to analyze the eﬀectiveness of the programs in reaching this goal. A second aim
is integration into regular, stable employment. Hence, we construct a second outcome
variable which treats ongoing self-employment and regular paid employment as a success
(outcome variable B). Finally, we also assess the eﬀects of the programs on the personal
income of participants. We start the discussion with the employment eﬀects over time,
before we present cumulated eﬀects and income eﬀects. For the latter two, we also present
conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences results to test the sensitivity.
Eﬀects on the Employment Status over Time: Figure 2 presents the treatment
eﬀects over time, where the upper panel relates to outcome variable A (not unemployed)
and the lower part to outcome variable B (self-employed or in regular employment). Eﬀects
for men (women) are depicted on the left (right) side of each row. Rows 1 and 3 show the
eﬀects of participating in SUS vs. nonparticipation, whereas rows 2 and 4 show the eﬀects
of BA.
Eﬀects start in the ﬁrst month after the treatment has begun. Before starting
the interpretation, one has to note the following: a look at both ﬁgures shows a strong
positive eﬀect at the beginning of our observation period. This can be seen as a ‘positive
locking-in eﬀect’. Whereas a locking-in eﬀect usually corresponds to a negative eﬀect
during participation in a program—for example, vocational training—the ﬁndings for our
programs are the opposite. Both participants and nonparticipants are unemployed in
the month before the treatment starts, then participants join the program and change
immediately to the ‘hoped-for’ state. That is, they leave unemployment and become self-
employed, which is viewed as a success for both outcome variables. Hence, one should
not overemphasize this large eﬀect at the start of the self-employment spell. BA runs
out after six months, and a reasonable interpretation should start there. Clearly, for the
three-year-long SUS, the problem is that participants may receive aid during the complete
observation period, interfering with interpretation. However, after 12 months, the transfer
payment is reduced from e600 to e360 and after 24 months it is further reduced to e240.
Since this reduced payment is hardly suﬃcient to cover social security contributions, it
gives us an initial idea of the success of the newly self-employed.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Let us start the discussion with outcome variable A. In the ﬁrst months after treat-
ment starts, we have very high positive eﬀects for both programs, lying well above 60
percentage points, irrespective of program and gender. This means, for example, that
14the unemployment probability of participants in SUS or BA is about 60 percentage points
lower than the unemployment probability of nonparticipants. Clearly, results at that point
have to be interpreted with care since both programs are still going on. The eﬀects show
a negative time trend, where the paths of the programs are very similar up to month six.
After that, the transfer payment for participants in BA terminates and the eﬀects plunge.
The downward trend continues but the rate of decrease is much lower. At the end of our
observation period, that is, 28 months after programs have started, we get an eﬀect of
approximately 28 percentage points for male and 23 percentage points for female partici-
pants in BA. If we look at the eﬀect of SUS versus nonparticipation, the downward trend
is much smoother, spiking somewhat in month 12, but decreasing relatively constantly to
an eﬀect of 34 percentage points for males and 44 percentage points for females in month
28.16 A similar pattern—but on a higher level—can be found for outcome variable B (see
lower part of Figure 2). This is a strong indication that both programs are not only eﬀec-
tive in avoiding unemployment but that they also give individuals much higher chances of
remaining employed (either in paid or self-employment). The diﬀerences in both outcome
variables can be explained by the fact that outcome variable A only treats registered un-
employment as a failure. When individuals retreat from the labor market—and this might
be especially relevant for women—they are not counted as a failure. Hence, the second
outcome variable, only treating individuals as a success if they are in employment, has
more explanatory power.
Cumulated Eﬀects: Table 5 contains the cumulative eﬀects over time, i.e., the cumu-
lative monthly eﬀects over the observation period. For the outcome variable ‘not unem-
ployed’ this shows the diﬀerence in months spent in unemployment between participants
and nonparticipants. It can be seen that male participants in SUS spend roughly 13.9
months less in unemployment than nonparticipants. For female participants in SUS the
eﬀect is approximately 16.4 months. The cumulative eﬀect for participants in BA is slightly
lower, at 11.6 months for men and 11.1 months for women. We have already discussed
that the eﬀects for the outcome variable ‘self-employment or paid employment’ are even
higher, which is also reﬂected by the cumulative eﬀects of around 15.5 (19.0) months for
men (women) in SUS and 13.2 (13.8) months for men (women) in BA.
16The dip in the eﬀects, especially for men, between months 16 and 20 is caused by a change in the
interview information. Individuals were interviewed twice, in 2005 and 2006. Months 16 to 20 might
involve a time overlap between the ﬁrst and second interview and might be prone to recall errors. Hence,
information for these months should be interpreted with care. For the overall interpretation, especially
when moving towards the end of the observation period, this should not pose any problems.
15Insert Table 5 about here
As outlined in Section 3.2, we also tested the sensitivity of our results with respect
to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by using a conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach. Before using such an approach, one has to determine the reference level for
the before/after diﬀerence. We choose three diﬀerent time periods for the comparison.
In the ﬁrst approach we use the time period from 1997 to 2002, that is, the six-year
employment history before entering the program. For the ﬁrst outcome variable, we sum
the months not spent in unemployment, whereas for the second, we sum the months spent
in paid employment. Additionally, we restrict the reference period to the latest three years
(2000-2002) as well as the earliest three years (1997-1999).
Looking at the table, we see that the results are remarkably stable. For example, the
eﬀect on outcome variable B for men in SUS was 13.9 months with the matching approach
and varies between 13.9 and 14.1 months with the CDID approaches. For the other groups
the variation is similar and shows that additionally controlling for possible unobserved
diﬀerences between participants and nonparticipants did not add much information for
our estimates. This can be seen as evidence of the validity of the CIA in our context.
Even when looking at outcome variable B, the variation is still negligible.
Eﬀects on Personal Income: After having established that participants in both pro-
grams are more likely to be employed and less likely to be unemployed than nonpar-
ticipants, we now investigate whether participants also earn more money. We use two
income-related outcome variables: the more relevant one is monthly income from self-
employment or paid employment (labor income). However, since it is often argued that
diﬀerences between (low) labor income and unemployment beneﬁts are especially low in
Germany, we will also look at the total personal income of individuals, that is, including
support such as unemployment beneﬁts.
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 6 contains the results for both outcome variables. Once again, we ﬁrst present
the results from matching estimates before presenting CDID results.17 It is quite striking
that all participants have higher incomes than nonparticipants for both possible outcome
variables. However, for females some of the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. The upper half
17For the DID procedure we use three reference levels: 1) The monthly unemployment beneﬁts before
the program started, 2) the average monthly income in 2002 and 3) the average monthly income from
regular employment in 2002.
16of Table 6 reveals that male participants in SUS earn around e600 per month more than
their counterparts in the comparison group. Once again, the CDID does not add much
information to the matching estimates since all estimates range between e620 and e690.
For female participants, the eﬀect is much lower (around e320) but still signiﬁcant. The
eﬀects for the participants in BA is even higher. Male participants earn about e820 more
per month. For females, the eﬀect, with e290, is comparable to the eﬀect for the SUS
participants. Hence, we can conclude that participating in either of the two programs has
helped individuals to earn more money at the end of our observation period. For males
this ﬁnding remains unaﬀected even if we use the total personal income of individuals as
an outcome variable, where we additionally take unemployment beneﬁts and other public
transfers into account. For females, however, looking at this outcome variable reveals
that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the total income of female participants and
nonparticipants.
Direct Employment Eﬀects - Descriptive Evidence: Policy makers usually hope
for a second positive eﬀect when subsidizing start-ups: additional employment eﬀects
through direct job-creation. Even though the eﬀects of these policies on (overall) employ-
ment cannot be judged by microeconometric analysis (since macroeconomic eﬀects would
have to be taken into account), we want to present some descriptive evidence on the extent
of these potential eﬀects.
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 7 contains information on the share of start-ups which have employees 28
months after the programs started as well as the number of employees. Two ﬁndings are
striking: ﬁrst, participants in BA are at this point in time more likely to have employees.
Second, it is rather unlikely that the businesses created with the start-up subsidy will
generate considerable additional employment in the future. To be more speciﬁc: 28%
(22%) of the male (female) participants in BA already have at least one employee at the
time of the second interview, whereas this is true for only 8–9% of the participants in
SUS. Male participants in BA not only have the most employees (around 4) but also the
highest share of regular employees (around 56%). Clearly, these numbers do not allow
to draw conclusions about the relative eﬀectiveness of the two start-up subsidies since
the businesses started diﬀer in a variety of aspects (e.g., start-up capital, industry, etc.).
Looking at the lower part of Table 7 shows that participants who have no employees yet
are also reluctant concerning the prospect of employing someone in the future. This is
17especially the case for the participants in SUS. Being asked whether they would like to
employ further persons in the future, 50% (37%) of the females (males) answered ‘No, by
no means’ and 34% (36%) ‘Rather no’. Hence, it is rather unlikely that these businesses
will create signiﬁcant additional employment in the future.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to evaluate two active labor market programs in East
Germany for which no empirical evidence on their eﬀectiveness had been gathered so far.
In light of the rather disappointing performance of other programs in East Germany—
including training programs, wage subsidies and job-creation schemes—our ﬁndings are
rather promising, showing that these programs designed to encourage unemployed people
to become self-employed might have the potential not only to combat East Germany’s
problem of persistently high unemployment, but also to increase its low (self-)employment
rate.
Our analysis is based on a dataset that combines administrative with survey data
and allows us to follow the employment paths of individuals for a period of 28 months
after the programs have started. For the ﬁrst program under consideration—the bridging
allowance—we observed participants for 22 months after the program ended. However,
participants in the second program—the start-up subsidy—are in their third year of par-
ticipation at the end of our observation period and mostly still receive further support
(although at a reduced rate). Therefore, the results for SUS have to be treated as pre-
liminary. Given the relatively stable participant structure in the BA program since the
introduction of the SUS, one can argue that the SUS attracts a diﬀerent ‘clientele’ for
self-employment. In general it can be stated that participants in SUS are less qualiﬁed
(when compared to BA participants) and that this program is more frequently used by
women.
We have evaluated the eﬀectiveness of both programs relative to nonparticipa-
tion. To this end we used a kernel matching estimator and a conditional diﬀerence-and-
diﬀerences estimator. Three outcome variables were of major interest. The ﬁrst was ‘not
unemployed’, corresponding to one of the main aims of the FEA. The second one combines
the two possible labor market states ‘in self-employment’ and ‘in paid employment’ into
one success criterion. The results indicate that both programs are successful: at the end of
our observation period, the unemployment rate of participants in BA was approximately
25 percentage points lower than that of nonparticipants, and for participants in SUS it
18was around 34 percentage points lower for men and as much as 44 percentage points lower
for women. Additionally, both the probability of being in self-employment and/or paid
employment and the personal income are signiﬁcantly higher for participants, even though
the income eﬀects for women are not always signiﬁcant.
This is one of the ﬁrst studies that allows inferences to be drawn about the eﬀec-
tiveness of start-up programs in East Germany. Most previous studies on the eﬀectiveness
of ALMP in the eastern part of Germany neglected these programs since the used admin-
istrative data does not contain information on employment (or earnings) of self-employed
individuals. In contrast to the other programs that have been evaluated recently (includ-
ing job-creation schemes and vocational training programs), we ﬁnd considerable positive
eﬀects for start-up subsidies. Hence, programs aimed at turning the unemployed into
entrepreneurs may be a promising strategy in East Germany.
To allow more precise policy recommendations, further research is needed. First
of all, the observation period for the start-up subsidy is still quite short and should be
extended. This will be especially important to judge the income eﬀects for women, which
are already partly not signiﬁcant at the moment. Second, the relative eﬀects of both
programs should be estimated, which would allow their respective designs to be judged as
well as their suitability for diﬀerent target groups. Additionally, it would be of interest to
look at the development of the start-ups in terms of turnover and number of jobs directly
created. Such an investigation would also enable an extensive cost-beneﬁt analysis taking
direct (and indirect) costs and beneﬁts into account.
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21Tables and Figures
Table 1: Self-employment, Unemployment and Start-Up Subsidies in East Germany, 1994-2004
1994 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Self-employeda (in %) 8.0 8.1 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.6 9.9 10.4 11.0
Unemployeda (in %) 15.1 13.6 20.4 19.9 20.2 20.8 21.5 22.6 22.2
ALMP participants (Entries in thousand)
Vocational Training – – 235.9 183.3 213.7 188.4 198.2 92.3 61.1
Job-Creation Schemes – – 271.8 210.5 181.4 130.1 121.4 109.4 112.9
Bridging Allowance 15.1 23.9 31.6 32.2 33.7 34.4 38.2 43.4 46.1
Start-Up Subsidy – – – – – – – 29.2 57.5
Sup. Self-Employment (total) 15.1 23.9 31.6 32.2 33.7 34.4 38.2 72.6 103.6
Sup. Self-Employmentb (total in %) 1.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 4.5 6.5
ALMP expenditure (in bn Euro)
ALMP - Total -.- 10.19 10.28 11.41 9.77 10.12 10.25 8.92 7.63
Vocational Training – – 2.79 2.78 2.75 2.79 2.88 1.97 1.28
Job-Creation Schemes – – 2.79 2.89 2.67 2.11 1.78 1.31 0.96
Bridging Allowancec 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.37
Start-Up Subsidy – – – – – – – 0.09 0.31
Sup. Self-Employment (total) 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.41 0.68
Sup. Self-Employment (total in %) -.- 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.7 4.6 8.9
a Relative to the workforce.
b Relative to all unemployed.
c The ﬁgures for the years 1994-1998 are approximated.
Source: Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit, various issues.
Table 2: Design of the Programmes




Approval of the business plan by an
external source (e.g. chamber of com-
merce)
Unemployment beneﬁt receipt
Approval of the business required since
November 2004
Support: Participant receives UB for six months
To cover social security liabilities, an
additional lump sum of approx. 70%
is granted
Participants receive a ﬁxed sum
of e600/month in the ﬁrst year,
e360/month (e240/month) in the
second (third) year
Claim has to be renewed every year, in-
come is not allowed to exceed e25,000
per year
Other: Social security is left at the individual’s
discretion
Participants are required to join the le-
gal pension insurance and receive a re-
duced rate on the legal health insurance
Details: §57(1) Social Code III. §421 l Social Code III.Table 3: Selected Descriptives
Men Women
Variable NP SUS BA NP SUS BA
Number of observations 593 371 448 350 276 202
Age (in years) 38.78 39.72 38.46 39.91 40.79 39.87
(9.93) (9.97) (9.10) (9.57) (9.41) (9.12)
Age 18-29 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14
(0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35)
Age 50-64 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.14
(0.37) (0.41) (0.34) (0.39) (0.42) (0.35)
Qualiﬁcation Variables
School Degree
No/Low Degree 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.07
(0.33) (0.37) (0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.25)
Upper secondary schooling 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.45
(0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50)
Job Qualiﬁcation
High Qualiﬁed 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.29
(0.38) (0.35) (0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.46)
Low Qualiﬁed 0.16 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.10
(0.36) (0.42) (0.33) (0.34) (0.39) (0.29)
Labour Market History
Unemployment duration (in months) 240.14 260.02 220.61 276.77 301.28 229.92
(236.01) (252.38) (212.78) (306.00) (326.80) (238.51)
Unempl. Duration < 3 months 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.31
(0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.46)
Unempl. Duration > 12 months 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.18
(0.39) (0.42) (0.35) (0.42) (0.44) (0.38)
Daily Unemployment Transfer (in Euro) 24.91 21.49 29.80 19.46 16.45 25.14
(10.23) (8.48) (12.86) (9.52) (7.95) (11.34)
Remaining Time of UB (in months) 5.33 4.22 6.32 3.66 3.34 5.78
(6.28) (5.95) (6.34) (5.23) (4.98) (6.59)
Average daily earnings in 2002 (in Euro) 29.74 21.73 45.90 19.49 14.03 34.03
(33.07) (24.32) (38.98) (26.30) (17.26) (34.31)
No. of placement propositions 4.35 3.94 3.45 5.44 4.35 3.37
(5.29) (5.59) (6.45) (6.49) (5.84) (4.82)
Note: All variables are measured one month before program start. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 4: Matching Quality — Some Indicators
Variable Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
MSD - Before Matching 9.18 7.40 15.10 19.43
MSD - After Matching 4.77 3.52 3.75 2.39
R2 - Before Matching 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14
R2 - After Matching 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
χ2 - Before Matching 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
χ2 - After Matching 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Participants oﬀ support 4 9 11 2
Note: Mean standardised diﬀerence (MSD) has been calculated as an
unweighted average of the standardised diﬀerence of all covariates.
Standardised diﬀerence before matching calculated as: 100 · (W 1 −
W 0)/{
p
(V1(W) + V0(W))/2} and standardised diﬀerence after match-
ing calculated as: 100 · (W 1M − W 0M)/{
p
(V1(W) + V0(W))/2}.
23Table 5: Cumulated Eﬀects - Matching and Conditional DiD
Start-Up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
Outcome Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e
Outcome Variable A: Not Unemployed (in months)
Matching 13.85 (0.60) 16.43 (0.65) 11.67 (0.57) 11.06 (0.85)
CDiD 1 14.13 (1.04) 16.07 (1.67) 10.97 (0.77) 11.30 (0.99)
CDiD 2 14.12 (0.74) 16.22 (0.92) 11.24 (0.65) 11.21 (0.89)
CDiD 3 13.86 (0.77) 16.28 (1.02) 11.40 (0.59) 11.15 (0.84)
Outcome Variable B: Employed or Self-Employed (in months)
Matching 15.53 (0.57) 19.00 (0.81) 13.22 (0.57) 13.77 (0.93)
CDiD 1 16.87 (1.45) 17.91 (2.01) 11.26 (1.08) 12.81 (1.94)
CDiD 2 16.94 (0.82) 18.53 (1.15) 12.60 (0.80) 13.77 (1.18)
CDiD 3 15.46 (0.98) 18.38 (1.45) 11.88 (0.93) 12.81 (1.56)
Note: Matching estimates are based on kernel matching as discussed in Section 5.2.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on 200 bootstrap replications.
Reference level for DiD 1: Total month not spend in unemployment (outcome vari-
able A) and spend in regular employment (outcome variable B) between 1997 and
2002.
Reference level for DiD 2: Same as DiD-1, but for the time period 2000-2002.
Reference level for DiD 3: Same as DiD-1, but for the time period 1997-1999.
Table 6: Eﬀects on Monthly Income - Matching and Conditional DiD
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
Outcome Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e Eﬀect s.e
Eﬀect on Monthly Income from Self-Employment/Regular Employment (in e)
Matching 580.60 (75.06) 321.76 (96.04) 817.57 (102.52) 286.03 (145.01)
CDiD 1 619.97 (87.76) 302.48 (102.28) 767.50 (108.25) 263.01 (142.63)
CDiD 2 693.12 (74.92) 331.07 (112.12) 717.46 (113.95) 257.26 (124.39)
CDiD 3 687.77 (101.54) 294.67 (128.96) 721.79 (118.19) 280.84 (124.93)
Eﬀect on Total Monthly Income (in e)
Matching 398.62 (79.55) 163.60 (83.67) 666.90 (102.58) 219.18 (119.97)
CDiD 1 437.98 (78.64) 144.33 (102.60) 616.83 (96.39) 196.16 (144.22)
CDiD 2 511.13 (83.58) 172.92 (103.05) 566.79 (97.28) 190.41 (147.34)
CDiD 3 505.78 (80.76) 136.52 (102.43) 571.13 (102.22) 213.99 (126.35)
Note: Matching estimates are based on kernel matching as discussed in Section 5.2. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are based on 200 bootstrap replications.
Reference level for DiD 1: Unemployment Beneﬁt before programme start.
Reference level for DiD 2: Average monthly income in 2002.
Reference level for DiD 3: Average monthly income from regular employment in 2002.




Men Women Men Women
Start-ups with employees 0.081 0.089 0.280 0.223
(0.27) (0.29) (0.45) (0.42)
Number of employees (mean) 2.000 1.474 4.011 2.355
(1.98) (0.77) (5.10) (1.40)
Share of regular employees 0.250 0.307 0.564 0.309
(0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.39)
Employees in the future?
Yes, surely 0.053 0.036 0.098 0.112
(0.23) (0.19) (0.30) (0.32)
Rather yes 0.214 0.129 0.256 0.168
(0.41) (0.34) (0.44) (0.38)
Rather no 0.359 0.335 0.342 0.206
(0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41)
No, by no means 0.374 0.500 0.303 0.514
(0.48) (0.50) (0.46) (0.50)
1 Numbers are shares unless stated otherwise; standard deviation in paren-
theses. Measured at the second interview after 28 months.
25Figure 1: Distribution of the Propensity Scores – Common Support1
Men Women
Note: Propensity score is estimated according to the speciﬁcation in Table A.1. Participants are depicted
in the upper half, nonparticipants in the lower half of each ﬁgure.
26Figure 2: Treatment Eﬀects over Time
Men Women
Outcome Variable A: Not Unemployed
Outcome variable B: Employed or Self-Employed
Note: Estimations are based on kernel matching as described in Section 5.2. Boot-
strapped standard errors are based on 200 replications.
27Appendix
Table A.1: Propensity Score Estimation Results - Coeﬃcientsa
SUS vs. Non-Participation BA vs. Non-Participation
Men Women Men Women
Socio-demographic characteristics
Age category
25-29 0.184 0.375 −0.147 −0.252
30-34 0.925∗ 0.746 0.463 0.08
35-39 0.365 0.584 −0.003 0.151
40-44 0.527 0.679 0.095 −0.13
45-49 0.656 0.967+ −0.391 0.412
50-64 1.422 ∗ ∗ 1.018∗ −0.107 −0.186
Children (Ref.: No children)
One child 0.255 0 −0.028 −0.289
Two or more children 0.484+ 0.051 −0.009 0.023
Qualiﬁcation variables
School degree
Lower secondary schooling 0.433 −1.33 0.413 −1.173
Middle secondary schooling 0.331 −1.376 0.381 −1.131
Specialised upper sec. schooling 0.511 −0.992 0.147 −1.146
Upper secondary schooling 0.342 −1.021 0.338 −1.196
Occupational group in previous profession (Ref.: manufacturing)
Agriculture −0.251 0.095 −0.331 0.285
Technical 0.508 0.945+ 0.199 1.357∗
Services 0.271 0.369 −0.018 0.828+
Other −0.274 0.031 −0.424 −0.121
Job Qualiﬁcation
Idiwquali0 −0.613+ −0.552 −0.344 −0.31
Idiwquali1 −0.129 −0.862+ −0.241 −0.42
Idiwquali2 −0.406∗ −0.209 −0.164 −0.282
Labour market history
Duration of last unemployment
3 months - < 6 months −0.458∗ −0.155 −0.366+ −0.367
6 months - < 1 year −0.075 −0.33 0.134 −0.155
≥ 1 year −0.032 0.017 0.111 0.155
With work experiences 0.295 −0.387 0.007 −0.198
Number of placement propositions −0.016 −0.043∗ 0.004 −0.040+
Unemployment beneﬁts −0.044 ∗ ∗ −0.043 ∗ ∗ 0.026∗ 0.047 ∗ ∗
Remaining beneﬁt entitlement −0.032+ −0.054∗ −0.037∗ −0.029
Daily income from regular employment
1999 0.001 0.002 0 0.005
2000 −0.006 0.007 0.009 −0.007
2001 0.012 −0.007 0.012+ 0.004
2002 −0.018∗ −0.026 ∗ ∗ −0.005 −0.001
Constant −1.705 0.836 −0.711 −1.375
Log-likelihood −570.413 −382.851 −642.031 −312.972
Hit-Rate 41.805 48.182 45.521 42.5
Note: **/*/+ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Additional variables included: Family status, health restrictions, nationality, desired working time, job qualiﬁca-
tion, months spend in regular employment and unemployment in the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, employment
status before unemployment, and dummy variables for the regional labour market context (strategy clusters). Full
estimation results and marginal eﬀects are available on request by the authors.
28Table A.2: Cross-Validation for the Bandwidth Selection
Start-Up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Men Women Men Women
h RMSE h RMSE h RMSE h RMSE
0.26977 0.49927 0.00091 0.52211 0.15221 0.49511 0.09469 0.49172
0.27977 0.49925 0.01091 0.47566 0.16221 0.49508 0.10469 0.49172
0.28977 0.49924 0.02091 0.48550 0.17221 0.49510 0.11469 0.49162
0.29977 0.49923 0.03091 0.49064 0.18221 0.49511 0.12469 0.49137
0.30977 0.49924 0.04091 0.49283 0.19221 0.49503 0.13469 0.49113
0.31977 0.49923 0.05091 0.49508 0.20221 0.49497 0.14469 0.49094
0.32977 0.49923 0.06091 0.49720 0.21221 0.49497 0.15469 0.49074
0.33977 0.49923 0.07091 0.49842 0.22221 0.49505 0.16469 0.49080
0.34977 0.49924 0.23221 0.49510 0.17469 0.49088
0.35977 0.49925 0.24221 0.49514 0.18469 0.49096
0.36977 0.49926 0.25221 0.49516 0.19469 0.49114
Note: We implement leave-one out cross-validation in a ﬁve step procedure (see, e.g.,
Galdo, 2005):
1. Deﬁne a bandwidth search grid. Here, we use lbw + 0.05 × g for g = 0,1,2,...,20,
where lbw = max[min[|P0i − P0−i|,|P0i − P0+i|]] is a lower bound deﬁned by the
propensity score values of comparison group members in the support region.
2. Starting with the lowest bandwidth and using only the comparison sample, esti-
mate the counterfactual outcome of each comparison unit using kernel matching on
the remaining N0 − 1 observations. Find the weighted MISE for that particular
bandwidth.
3. Repeat step 2 for each of the remaining bandwidth values. Find the particular
bandwidth h
+ that minimizes the weighted MISE across all estimations.
4. Reﬁne the bandwidth h
+ by deﬁning a +/−0.05 neighborhood around h
+ and select
a new search grid.
5. Repeat steps 2 and 3 and select the bandwidth that yields the minimum weighted
MISE among all estimations.
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